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THE RESURGENT SECOND AMENDMENT 1

EDITOR'S NOTE
Book reviews are as versatile a tool as has ever been devised. They can critique or compliment a book, and often do both. They discuss prevailing theory while remaining free of theoretical dogma. Most crucially, they invite us
to enrich ourselves with the texts they preview. The publication of book reviews in traditional law reviews provides an academic flavor, but the main
course is still the quality and character of the books being reviewed.
This volume examines texts that engage an array of topics. Some discuss
rights protections for the precious privileges that are often controversial yet
still distinctly American. Texts on legal mechanics suggest where our government is headed, while texts on U.S. history look back on how far we have
come. ~ome of the books reviewed discuss whether and how judges should
defy unJust laws, even if sworn to uphold them. Race in America has always
been a crucial and compelling issue, and it has inspired several books revi~wed herein. Of course, constitutional law and politics feature heavily in
this volume. They are topics about which legal minds never run out of things
to say.

I hope this volume can inform a broad audience on the virtues of the books
revi~wed. I thank all of our many contributors this year, as well as Sandy
Levmson and Mark Graber for their ongoing commitment to excellence.
-Jason McVicker
Editor in Chief
Tulsa Law Review

Robert J. CottroP
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ROBERT H. CHURCHILL, To SHAKE THEIR GUNS IN THE TYRANT'S FACE:
LIBERTARIAN POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE MILITIA MOVEMENT (Univ.
of Mich. Press 2009). Pp. 384. Cloth. $40.00. Paperback. $26.95.
ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN
AMERICA (W.W. Norton & Co. 2011). Pp. 361. Hardcover. $27.95.
The Supreme Court's narrowly divided decision in District of Columbia v. Heller
holding that the Second Amendment protected the right of individuals to possess
handguns in their homes was the result of the convergence of a number of different
forces, none of which would have seemed likely as little as two decades earlier. 3 The
first of these was the legal academy's rediscovery of the Second Amendment in the
1990s. Those of us who participated in that rediscovery should acknowledge that much
of the heavy lifting involved in unearthing the history was done by independent scholars
affiliated with the gun owners' rights movement. 4 Still, the legal academy's rediscovery
was critical, giving the endorsement of some of the nation's leading legal scholars,
including William Van Alstyne, Akhil Amar, Sanford Levinson, Scott Powe, and
Laurence Tribe, to what should be a fairly unremarkable proposition, that "the right of
the people to keep and bear arms" was meant to protect the right of the people to keep
and bear arms. 5
1. Reviewing ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA
(2011) and ROBERT H. CHURCHILL, To SHAKE THEIR GUNS IN THE TYRANT'S FACE: LIBERTARIAN POLITICAL
VIOLENCE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE MILITIA MOVEMENT (2009). The comments on WINKLER, supra, were
based on a pre-publication draft manuscript.
2. Harold Paul Green Research Professor of Law, and Professor of History and Sociology, The George
Washington University.
3. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
4. In the 1980s, three independent scholars, Stephen Halbrook, David Hardy, and Donald B. Kates Jr.,
were particularly important in challenging what by then had become the conventional wisdom that the Second
Amendment only provided a limited protection connected with militia activity. See, e.g., STEPHEN P.
HALBROOK, THAT EVERYMAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (Univ. of N.M.
Press I st ed.1984) (arguing that the Second Amendment was intended to preserve life and property as well as
provide security from a tyrannical government); David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the
Historiography of the Bill of Rights, 4 J. L. & POL. I (1987) (suggesting that both the individual and collective
rights rationales are both required to fully comprehend the meaning of the Second Amendment); Don B. Kates,
Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204
(1983).The writings of historians Joyce Lee Malcolm and Robert Shalhope also played a critical role in the
academic reassessment of the issue in the 1980s. See Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and
Bear Arms: The Common Law Tradition, IO HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285 (1983); Robert E. Shalhope, The
Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. AM. HIST. 599 (1982).
5. For a discussion of the increased acceptance of the individualist model of the Second Amendment in the
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The triumph of the individual rights view in Heller depended on more than a shift
in scholarly opinion. We can probably agree that but for the controversial victory of
George W. Bush over Albert Gore in 2000, the outcome in Heller would have been quite
different. His victory gave President Bush the opportunity to appoint two Justices, John
Roberts and Samuel Alito, who were persuaded by the individualist reading, to the High
Court. Even the combination of a more favorable Court and an intellectual climate in
which the individual rights view of the Second Amendment had regained a decent
measure of intellectual respectability would not have been enough to bring about the
Court's decision. Somebody had to bring the case. It is the story of that case, the
attorneys who planned it, their opponents, and supporters that is the subject of Adam
Winkler's fascinating study Gunfight: The Battle Over the Right to Bear Arms in
America. 6
Winkler provides an up-close examination of Heller. He is also concerned with
recalling a history in which both the right to have arms and the regulation of guns co7
existed in the American past. If the modern debate has posited that these two concepts
are polar opposites, Winkler uses Gunfight to remind us of their essential compatibility.
Although Winkler's switching back and forth between the micro-history of the District
of Columbia ("D.C.") litigation and the broader narrative concerning gun rights and gun
regulation in American history gives Gunfight a somewhat disjointed character at times,
Winkler is skillful at tying up the loose ends, bringing coherence to the broader narrative.
D.C. 's handgun ban and the litigation that ultimately overturned it are, of course,
central to that narrative. There were good reasons why D.C. would become the venue for
the Supreme Court's first serious consideration of the Second Amendment. A good case
could be made that no other statute was likely to produce the Court's explicit recognition
of an individual right to arms, at least not as a case of first impression. The Court had
managed to avoid hearing a case directly on point for 69 years after its decision in United
8
States v. Miller. The District's statute seemed to be written almost as if it were designed
to invite a Second Amendment challenge. The statute was an outlier, extreme in
American terms. It banned ordinary firearms, not automatic weapons. 9 Its prohibition hit
the entire population, not select classes like minors or people with criminal records. The
statute also mandated that rifles and shotguns had to be rendered inoperative so that they
could not be used for home defense. 10 No claim could be made that the statute was a
reasonable regulation consistent with a private right to arms. To make it even more
enticing, the District of Columbia was federal territory, so incorporation would not be an
issue. 11
That D.C. would provide the vehicle for the judicial revival of the Second

1990s see Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. R. 461 (1995).
6. WINKLER, supra note 1, at 14.
7. Id. at 12-14.
8. Id. at 24-25; United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
9. WINKLER, supra note 1, at 17.
IO. Id.
11. Incorporation, or the application of the Bill of Rights to the states, had been one issue that had caused
some courts to dismiss claims that state regulations infringed on Second Amendment rights. These cases relied
on the Court's ruling in the nineteenth century case Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
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Amendment was more than a little ironic. The handgun ban, passed in 1976, was
originally seen as an opening salvo in what was to be a nationwide campaign to get large
numbers of major cities to enact similar restrictions. 12 It was hoped that this effort would
be a prelude to strict federal regulation and ultimately prohibition. 13 There were largely
unsuccessful efforts to replicate the D.C. ban elsewhere in the 1970s and 80s. A
statewide referendum in 1976 that would have banned handguns in Massachusetts failed,
despite the Bay State's generally liberal politics. 14 The NRA had successfully convinced
a number of state legislatures to pass firearms preemption legislation, limiting the ability
of local municipalities to enact restrictive legislation. 15 Only Chicago and a few small
towns in Illinois followed the District of Columbia's example with outright bans on
handgun ownership. Still, when the D.C. ban passed, it was hailed as a jewel in the
crown of the gun control movement, a movement which at the time was often frank in its
desire for prohibition on handgun ownership and severe restrictions on long gun
ownership. 16 The movement's advocates were also often openly hostile to the idea of
gun ownership for self-defense. 17 Thus, the statute would stay on the books, a relic of
another time which would invite the Court to take action.
Winkler gives us an insightful account of the litigation's unfolding. We meet the
lawyers who planned the case, Robert Levy, businessman, lawyer, and fellow of the Cato
Institute, Clark Neilly and other libertarian lawyers who supported the effort. 18 Winkler
also tells us about Alan Gura, a newcomer to big time appellate litigation who would,
through Heller, make constitutional history. 19 Gunfight also introduces us to ordinary
people, not part of the American gun culture who nonetheless became advocates for the
rights of gun owners simply out of the desire to defend their lives. Individuals such as
Tom Palmer, a gay man who was only able to protect himself because he had brandished
a pistol stopping a group of gay bashing thugs about to attack him, 20 and Shelly Parker, a
black woman who fought to rid her neighborhood of drugs and then feared retaliation
from the dope pushers who ruled the streets where she lived. 21 Parker's plight managed
to produce a rare sympathetic portrait of a Second Amendment activist in the
Washington Post, a paper known for its constant advocacy for stricter gun control
laws. 22
Winkler also tells about Dick Heller, a security guard at a federal courthouse who
lived across the street from an abandoned housing project. 23 Heller carried a gun on the
12. WINKLER, supra note 1, at 18.
13. Id. at 18-19.
14. From Bottle Bans to A-Plants .. . How Americans Voted, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 15, 1976, at
103.
15. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.§ 29.35.145 (2008); Aruz. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 13-3108 (2010 & Supp. 2010)
(West).
16. See GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 9-12 (1991).
17. See WINKLER, supra note 1, at 22.
18. Id. at 45-60.
19. Id. at 6-8.
20. Id. at 21.
21. Id. at 43, 60.
22. Elissa Silverman, Fight Against Ban Grew Out of Fear, Frustration, WASH. POST, April 8, 2007, at
C06.
23. WINKLER, supra note 1, at 42-43.
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job, but could not keep one to defend his home from predators who lived in his
neighborhood. 24 Heller managed to survive standing challenges to lend his name to the
25
Supreme Court case.
Gurifight guides the reader through the "fog of litigation" from D.C. 's perspective.
D.C. had inherent difficulties defending the statute. The Courts were more conservative.
This was true of the Supreme Court and the D.C. circuit as well. The statute was hard to
defend. It was, in effect, an anti-self defense statute, requiring the citizen to be
essentially defenseless at home, something no other American jurisdiction demanded.
The District government made no efforts at trial to acknowledge a home defense
exception. Indeed, D. C.'s advocates took a hard line in the District Court insisting the
ban on weapons for home defense was absolute and those who possessed rifles and
shotguns within the District's boundaries had to keep them inoperable. 26 It was an
admission that would come back to haunt the D.C. advocate before the Supreme Court. 27
Heller's challenge would lose in the District Court, but prevail in the D.C. Circuit.
It was the first such ruling in American history. The ball was in D.C. 's court. Would the
District apply for certiorari? Would it accept the appellate court's ruling and allow the
statute to be struck down? Many on both sides of the debate were nervous. The stakes
were high, perhaps higher for supporters of stricter gun control who had long enjoyed the
support of the lower federal courts. The D.C. litigation could reverse that. Heller was
particularly dangerous from their point of view. The facts were bad. Total prohibition
and a ban on the instruments of self-defense in the home were not the kind of facts that
made a favorable ruling likely. A ruling that the Second Amendment protected an
individual's right to arms would be a devastating blow for the gun control movement.
Nevertheless, D.C. persisted. The District would petition for certiorari and defend
the statute mandating handgun prohibition. That defense, as Winkler shows, was marred
by internal squabbles within the D.C. government, internal squabbles that indicated no
small amount of disarray as Washington's government prepared for the landmark case.
D.C. 's internal conflicts led to the relatively late replacement of appellate advocate Alan
Morrison with former Solicitor General Walter Dellinger as D.C.'s lawyer. Although
both men were seasoned High Court advocates, Morrison had had more time to prepare
and would have been able to devote his full energies to the case. Dellinger was preparing
other cases for the Court when he was asked to represent D.C.
Gunfight gives us an excellent view of the oral argument. 28 The Justices were
aware of Gura's inexperience. His most open ally on the Court, Justice Scalia, an avid
hunter who had previously expressed his support for individual rights, gave the young
attorney some coaching. At times, Scalia suggested that the libertarian lawyer slow down
and at other points he suggested possible responses to questions posed by other justices.

24. Id. at 42.
25. Id. at 91-92.
26. Id. at 176-77.
27. During oral argument, D.C.'s advocate, Walter Dellinger, tried to repair the damage. In response to
questioning from Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alita, and Justice Scalia, he asserted that D.C. recognized a
self-defense exception to the rule that rifles and shotguns had to be rendered inoperable. See Transcript of Oral
Argument at 24, 82-86, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290).
28. WINKLER, supra note I, at 173-79.

2011

THE RESURGENT SECOND AMENDMENT

5

But Scalia's sympathies were not a surprise. The big question was Kennedy. How would
he go? Early on, the swing Justice provided a hint that he was leaning toward an
individualist reading of the Second Amendment; some observers noted a look of troubled
resignation to Dellinger's face.
Winkler is successful at many things, from his vivid portrait of the Heller
litigation to his discussion of firearms use and firearms regulation in the nation's history.
But curiously, Winkler gives us an all too cursory intellectual history of the Second
Amendment controversy, one that fails to do the topic justice. It also shortchanges one of
Winkler's central concerns: how to reconcile the right to arms with reasonable
regulation. For Winkler, the history is fairly straightforward. The collective rights or
militia only view of the Second Amendment was the prevailing one until relatively
recently. The individual rights view is a relative newcomer, brought about by the
reaction of the NRA and others to the national gun control movement spawned by the
tragedy and turmoil of the 1960s. As evidence for this, Winkler cites an article by
political scientist Robert Spitzer, indicating the absence of law review literature
29
supporting the individual rights view before the 1960s. The Second Amendment,
Winkler believes, should be recognized as protecting an individual right, but more so on
a living constitution theory than on grounds of original intent or longstanding acceptance
of the individualist view.
A stronger case can and has been made for the opposite history. Without getting
into the debates over the eighteenth century framers' intentions and understandings, it is
clear that the individual rights view of the Second Amendment was the dominant one
30
among nineteenth century jurists and commentators. Nineteenth century commentators
certainly saw the link between the right to arms and the militia, but not the restrictive
linkage urged by the modem gun control movement. The prevailing view was that an
armed population was an inchoate militia that could be summoned to aid the state and
could also act as a bulwark against potential tyranny. That view was repeatedly endorsed
in the state court jurisprudence and even in the Supreme Court's case law, most notably
in Presser v. Illinois. 31 This point of view was endorsed by leading nineteenth century
commentators including St. George Tucker, Justice Joseph Story, and Michigan jurist
Thomas Cooley. 32 The notion that the population at large was protected by the right to
have arms also co-existed quite comfortably with the idea of regulation, including
29. See Robert J. Spitzer, Symposium on the Second Amendment: Fresh Looks: Lost and Found:
Researching the Second Amendment, 76 CHI. -KENT L. REV. 349, 363-66 (2000).
30. For a good general treatment of this, see David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth
Century, 1998 BYUL. REV. 1359 (1998).
31. Although Presser stated that the Second Amendment did not limit state regulation of firearms, the
opinion by Justice Woods also stated:
It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the reserved
military force or reserve militia ... the States cannot, even laying the constitutional
provision in question out of view, prohibit the people from keeping and b~aring anns, so
as to deprive the United States of their rightful resource for mamtammg the pubhc
security, and disable the people from performing their duty to the general government.
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886).
32. Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, Public Safety and the Right to Bear Arms, in THE BILL OF
RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA: REVISED AND EXPANDED 88, 94-95 (David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr.
eds., 2d ed. 2008); THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 297-99 (3d ed. 1898).
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legislation prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons, among other restrictions. This
view would remain the prevailing one well into the twentieth century. It underlay the
Court's decision in Miller, 33 and would be also be reiterated by, among others, political
scientist Edward S. Corwin, one of the nation's leading constitutional commentators in
34
the first half of the twentieth century. The idea that the Second Amendment was
originally meant to support the individual citizen's right to have arms as a potential
hedge against tyrannical government was also endorsed by Roscoe Pound in his 1957
published lectures, The Development of Constitutional Guarantees of Liberty, although
the former Dean of Harvard Law School called for minimal if any enforcement of the
amendment on prudential grounds. 35 Far from having an ancient pedigree, the varying
views that the Second Amendment only protects members of the militia acting in an
official capacity is the newcomer, one that only gained strength with the post 1960s gun
control movement.
My point here is not to rehearse once again the individual versus collective rights
arguments. These have been well covered in other fora and the debate will go on.
However, I do believe that a closer examination of the intellectual history of the debate
and the nearly successful effort to nullify the Second Amendment in the second half of
the twentieth century could have brought Winlder to a better understanding of one of his
central concerns, how to reconcile a right to arms with the need for firearms regulation?
Why is there a huge political movement ready to attack any effort at regulation? It exists
precisely because the gun control movement that arose out of the turmoil and tragedy of
the 1960s was radically different from earlier attempts at firearms regulation. If
regulators in the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century were largely
concerned with how weapons might be carried, or whether a relatively small subset of
weapons were too dangerous for public use, the modem gun control movement has
always had a strong prohibitionist streak. For many, the D.C. statute was not extreme. It
was a model. This prohibitionist streak had to be accommodated with a radical reunderstanding of the Second Amendment, one that stated in effect that it protected
nothing. There was no constitutional barrier to gun prohibition. This new vision never
gained public acceptance. 36 But it did bring about the transformation of the NRA from a

33. Until Heller, Miller was routinely cited by the lower federal courts for the proposition that the Second
Amendment did not protect the right of individuals to have arms outside of a militia context. That doctrine
would not stand up under a careful reading of the McReynolds opinion in Miller. Nowhere in Miller does
McReynolds inquire as to the militia status of Jack Miller and Frank Layton, originally indicted for unlawful
transportation of a sawed off shotgun. The Court's opinion recognizes that at the time of the enactment of the
Second Amendment the militia consisted of the entire male population that was expected to perform its duties
with privately supplied weapons. The Miller Court relied heavily on the nineteenth century Tennessee case,
Aymette v. State, which might be simplified into the proposition that certain weapons, those which civilized
people would use to come to the aid of state authorities are constitutionally protected, while weapons which are
largely used by criminals are not. 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 159-60 (1840). Following the reasoning in Aymette,
McReynolds declined to talce judicial notice that a sawed off shotgun was ordinary militia equipment and thus
constitutionally protected. U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). The focus was on the weapon and not the
individual's militia status.
34. EDWARDS. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY203 (11th ed. 1954).
35. Roscoe Pound, From the Revolution to the Constitution, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY 82, 89-91 (1957).
36. See, e.g., JAMES D. WRIGHT, PETER H. ROSSI & KATHLEEN DALY, UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME,
AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 238-40 (1983).
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group that, as Winkler shows, was supportive of gun control measures in the first half of
the twentieth century to one that fiercely opposed most regulatory measures from the
1970s on.
The knowledge that the gun control movement believed in no constitutional
limitations to gun control and that that vision was supported by the nation's elites,
including the national press and most of the federal judiciary gave the gun control debate
much of its all-or-nothing character. Proposed regulations would be debated not on the
grounds of their reasonability or efficacy, but as to whether or not they were stepping
stones to further regulation and ultimate prohibition. The knowledge that the courts
would set no limits in this area only fed the determination of gun owners not to yield an
inch in the debate. It is too early to tell whether the Court's decisions in Heller and
McDonald will change this dynamic. The Court has at long last announced judicial
protection of still undetermined scope for the individual's righ~s under the Sec~nd
Amendment. Both decisions purport to be very modest, only m effect overturnmg
statutes in jurisdictions that were, in American terms, extreme outliers. Even so, a
. d'1cm
. l overreac h .37
number of jurists have denounced both decisions as examp1es of JU
The reconciliation between the right to arms and reasonable regulation that Adam
Winkler would like to see established is not likely to come soon. Instead, it is likely to
remain for some time the victim of the bitter culture wars that have been part of the
Second Amendment debate for better than two generations.
The subject of historian Robert H. Churchill's To Shake Their Guns in the Tyrant's
Face: Libertarian Political Violence and the Origins of the Militia Movement is how that
38
bitter cultural struggle helped bring about the militia movement of the 1990s.
Churchill's task is to take us beyond the familiar stereotypes of the movement and its
members: racists, right wing wackos, gun nuts etc., to provide a far more complex and
nuanced narrative. In doing so, he provides a link between the modem militia movement
and the libertarian ideology that informed a substantial portion of the political actors of
the founding era. The Second Amendment appears in Churchill's study less as the object
of judicial interpretation or academic commentary and more as an ele~ent of po_pul~r
constitutionalism and national memory. For Churchill, the critical histoncal quest10n 1s
how ordinary Americans and their often opposing political factions have remembered the
39
American Revolution and its insurrectionary implications. A critical part of that
historical question is how Americans in different eras have seen the interrelated issue~ of
the right to have arms, the preservation of militias, and the possi~ilitie~ of revo~t agamst
a potentially tyrannical state. 40 An understanding of that hentage 1s essential to an
understanding of the militia movement of the 90s.
Churchill's central concern is the question of how an idea that was once a central
part of American political and constitutional theory ultimately became marginalized, a

37. Including, interestingly enough, conservative jurists Richard Posner and J. Harvie Willcinson. See I.
Harvie Willcinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 266-67
(2009); Richard Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
Aug. 27, 2008, http://www.tnr.com/print/article/books/defense-looseness.
38. See CHURCHILL, supra note 1, at 22-23, 185-90.
39. Id. at 18-23.
40. Id. at 212-16.
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notion only entertained, at least publically, by political extremists. 41 The idea that a right
to arms and the preservation of popular and local militias were desirable as a hedge
against a state gone bad were mainstream ideas in the founding generation. Federalists
and anti-Federalists alike were heirs to the English Whig notion of the legitimacy of
revolution against a sovereign guilty of trampling upon ancient liberties. 42 In their view,
like the English Whigs of 1688, they had overthrown the rule of a despotic monarch who
sought to deny them the traditional rights ofEnglishmen. 43 They agreed in principle that
the capacity for popular revolution had to be preserved, even if they differed on the
particulars of when a revolution might be justified, or what would be the appropriate
mechanism for conducting insurrection. 44
That revolutionary era consensus was light years away from the United States in
the 1990s. The Second Amendment faced what many correctly believed was a hostile
White House and a judiciary that was largely about the business of following Dean
Pound's advice to nullify the constitutional provision protecting the right to arms. The
militia movement that in many respects was echoing the prevailing political philosophy
of the founding era was being roundly condemned from all points on the political
compass. Churchill does a yeoman's job in guiding the reader through political violence
and its justification in founding era ideology as a chapter in the history of American
ideas. If the Federalists had agreed during the War for Independence that the Crown's
usurpations justified taking up arms and overthrowing the British yoke, they were
considerably less enthusiastic by the time they were in power and Revolutionary War
veteran John Fries was engaging in armed protests against taxes levied during John
45
Adams' administration. This uncomfortable co-existence of the revolutionary era's
libertarian philosophy and the need for an ordered government and an ordered society
would not end with the founding generation. Long after that generation had passed from
the scene, others would draw inspiration from the American Revolution and the
Declaration of Independence with their calls for natural rights, which include the right to
overthrow an oppressive government. Often the historical actors would come from
diametrically opposite points of the political compass. Abolitionists would draw on this
tradition when they engaged in extra-legal actions to prevent the forced return of fugitive
slaves to southern states. 46 Their ideological opponents, pro-slavery and pro-Confederate
Democrats, would also call on libertarian memories of the Revolutionary era when they
invoked images of Lincoln as tyrant and usurper while advocating insurrection against
the Unionist government. 47
Churchill adds this narrative of political violence and political resistance to his
discussion of modem America. Political violence would often be racial violence. 48 This
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would surface almost immediately after the Civil War with the growth of the first Ku
Klux Klan. 49 In the wake of the First World War, the second Klan continued this
tradition. 50 It was able to cloak itself in an all-American package in many parts of the
nation, emphasizing the virtues of white, Protestant America and launching attacks on
blacks, Jews, Catholics, radicals, and the foreign born. 51 The second Klan was large
scale and in many states mainstream in the 1920s. This group dominated politics in
Indiana and was actively courted by political leaders in many states. Hooded Klansmen
and women staged grand parades down the nation's great boulevards, including
Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington D.C. Churchill also tells us about labor violence
and the clandestine anti-Negro, anti-Catholic, anti-Semitic, and anti-foreign Black
Legion of the 1930s. 52 Churchill tells us of the American left's fear of the Black Legion
later and how that fear led in tum to the liberal repression of political actors on the right.
It is that latter concern, repression from the left from modem liberals, where To
Shake Their Guns in the Tyrant's Face is at its most troubling and most valuable. The
discussion of the revolutionary era, nineteenth century, and early twentieth century
America are a prelude to Churchill's principal concern: the militia movement of the
1990s. The movement arose in part because of ideological disagreement over the
meaning of the Second Amendment. But something more was afoot. As Churchill
observes, the nation's political and intellectual elites had long since shed the founding
era's belief in a right to revolution. They had done so for many reasons. The idea of
insurrection rarely sits well with established leaders for obvious reasons. The nation had
found this out early in its history when the Federalists, who had led the Revolution
against George III, found themselves facing acts of rebellion in response to excise taxes
they had imposed on the new nation. But something more had brought the notion of
insurrection into bad odor among the nation's leadership classes in the latter half of the
twentieth century. This notion was associated with political extremism, the kind of
extreme movements of the left and right that had brought other nations to ruin, the kind
of extremism that the American nation had gone to war against and had been
permanently mobilized against since the early 1940s. Also, as the twentieth century was
drawing to a close, support for insurrection was increasingly associated with
uncomfortable memories, which served as unwelcome reminders of the nation's racist
past, a past the nation was working hard to try and shed. Whatever the founding
generation may have thought of insurrection, the leading heirs of the Revolution that
began with a declaration justifying armed rebellion had turned firmly against the notion.
It should be noted that the idea that insurrection could be justified, like the individualist
view of the Second Amendment, still resonated strongly with significant segments of the
American population. Politicians would have to at least give lip service to the concept, as
indeed they would have to acknowledge support for the individualist view of the Second
Amendment, even if the nation's 'betters' repeatedly told the citizenry that both concepts
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were at best foolish and at worse downright dangerous. 53
But it would take more than disagreement over the Second Amendment and its
preservation of the possibility of revolution to bring about the militia movement. It
would also take, as Churchill shows, the development of a more paramilitary approach to
law enforcement: the transformation of police officers into quasi-soldiers, who are at
times backed up by armored vehicles, armed helicopters, and automatic weapons. 54
Many of these developments were not exactly new in many of the nation's inner city
communities, but the application of such tactics in many white communities was new
and often surprising. Police charged with fighting the ever-unsuccessful drug war or
enforcing gun laws that were unpopular in many communities found themselves in
conflict with broad segments of the white working and middle class populations. This
helped bring about a re-examination of many of the revolutionary philosophies of the
founding era.
Federal law enforcement would supply the match to this tinderbox with two
incidents of overreaching, if not incompetent and downright criminal behavior on the
part of federal officials. Neither Randy Weaver, the White Supremacist of Ruby Ridge,
Idaho, nor David Koresh, leader of the Branch Davidian cult of Waco, Texas, were
particularly sympathetic characters; indeed they were quite odious. However, in their
efforts to get both men, federal law enforcement agents killed dozens of people who
either had committed only minor offenses or in some cases were entirely i1mocent of any
crime, including children burned alive at the Branch Davidian compound. 55 Federal
agents did so when, it should be added, less lethal alternatives were available. 56 The
militia movement was born in large part as a reaction to the two incidents. 57
Churchill is at his best in showing the many variations of that movement and the
individuals who joined. The militia movement was accused of being racist. In some
cases, the charge was well deserved. But many militia members went out of their way to
extend a welcome to black members, some of whom became leaders in the militia
movement in their own right. The refusal of many liberal groups to recognize this fact
doubtless says a great deal about the persistence of stereotypes of a racist middle
America among many liberals long after that stereotype, at least in its crudest form, has
become woefully out of date. Churchill's discussion of the conduct of federal agents at
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Certainly one of the chief guarantees of freedom under any govefilil!ent, no matter
how popular and respected, is the right of citizens to keep and bear arms. This is not to
say that firearms should not be very carefully used, and that definite safety rules of
precaut10n should not be taught and enforced. But the right of citizens to bear arms is
just one more guarantee against arbitrary government, one more safeguard against a
tyranny which now appears remote in America, but which historically has proved to be
always possible.
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both Ruby Ridge and Waco also raises disturbing questions that go far beyond the simple
issue of liberal elites engaging in crude stereotyping. Were officials in the Justice
Department, particularly Attorney General Janet Reno, not held fully accountable for
botched lethal operations because the victims came from groups that were deeply
unpopular with liberal constituencies? Was the Clinton administration able to silence the
militia movement's very valid protest of misconduct by federal law enforcement agents
in part because it was able to use false stereotyping of the movement's members and to
enhance those stereotypes by falsely linking Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh
with the militia movement? These are particularly disturbing questions for those
concerned with the rule of law and how the law is administered to disfavored groups.
Churchill has done an important service by reminding us of this.
The militia movement of the 1990s has receded, a victim both of bad publicity and
of the changing times. That movement was in large part a response to the perceived
threat that the Clinton administration posed to gun ownership and the continued viability
of the Second Amendment. That threat seems less dire in light of eight years of the
Second Amendment-friendly Bush administration, and the Court's decisions in Heller
and McDonald. Even after its first two years, the Obama administration has failed to
revive the perception of an imperiled Second Amendment, at least at the levels that
existed in the 1990s. The first decade of the twenty-first century has also seen new
concerns. Terrorism and economic hardship occupy the national consciousness in ways
that would have been unimaginable in the last decade of the old century. The remedies
for these ills and how to implement them without fundamentally altering our previous
assumptions that we could enjoy a society that protected a broad degree of both security
and freedom have largely crowded out the debate over the Second Amendment and its
meanings. The debate is still there, in inchoate form. The individual rights view of the
amendment enjoys, as it always has, broad popular support. Moreover, to that popular
support has been added a narrow endorsement by the nation's highest Court. However,
that acceptance on the part of the nation's jurists is precarious. The debate is still with us,
and Winkler and Churchill both do much to help us understand it.

